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Systemic Risks in the Electric 
Power Infrastructure?
by Carsten Orwat, ITAS
As envisaged by developers, economic ac-
tors or politicians, advanced information and 
communication technologies (ICT) should be 
utilized in electricity infrastructures to an un-
precedented level, mainly to enhance the ca-
pability to handle the more volatile power sup-
ply by renewable energy sources. However, 
the extended use of ICT can also be a source 
of additional risks, due to the increased 
“openness” of the ICT-intensive infrastruc-
ture, increased complexities, interdependen-
cies or system-wide failures, potential failures 
of ever more complex governance structures, 
or incoherent technical and governance de-
velopments. We raise the question whether 
systemic risks may emerge in the electricity 
sector, and which research perspectives for 
technology assessment may then be useful.1
1 Ongoing and Envisioned Developments 
in the Electricity Infrastructure
Recently, there is considerable political support 
for modernizing the electricity industry by de-
veloping and deploying advanced information 
and communication technologies (ICT), and to 
realize visions of the so-called “smart grid” or 
“internet of energy” (e.g., European Commission 
2009; BMWi 2008; IEA 2011). One of the main 
goals of such strategies is to enhance the large-
scale integration of the volatile power supply by 
renewable energy sources, especially photovolta-
ic- and wind energy. Additionally, it is aimed at 
enhancing the reliability of the electricity system 
in view of an ageing electricity infrastructure. 
To these ends, a multitude of technical and or-
ganizational measures for bettering the balance 
of the generation, transmission, distribution and 
consumption of energy at all stages of the elec-
tricity value chain are currently being proposed, 
developed, deployed or enhanced (Table 1).
While ICT systems have been used in the 
electricity sector for decades, the ongoing and 
envisaged developments cause a higher degree 
of automation, connectivity, and virtualization for 
the management and control of the electricity sys-
tem. On the one hand, this may have many advan-
tages, such as increased economic and energy ef-
ficiency or enhanced reliability. On the other hand, 
it is also widely acknowledged that new vulner-
abilities and cyber security issues are introduced.
Actors of public governance have already 
responded to them (e.g., NIST 2010; NERC 
2010). In Germany, like in many other countries, 
the government has initiated a Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection (CIP) strategy (named “KRITIS” 
strategy) that is, among other things, realized by 
the recent implementation of the Cyber Security 
Strategy, including the establishment of a Nation-
al Cyber Response Centre and a National Cyber 
Security Council (BMI 2011). Additionally, na-
tional multi-actor crisis-management exercises 
(LÜKEX) are regularly carried out, of which the 
exercise in 2011 is explicitly dedicated to cyber 
attacks. Additionally, several laws3 require secu-
rity measures, and a broad range of standards and 
guidelines define ICT security, in particular the 
ISO/IEC 27000 standard series (overview given 
by Wendt 2011; see also DKE 2010).
In the following, we elaborate on the interac-
tions of technological developments with govern-
ance structures, interpreting them as ambivalent re-
lations. Governance is necessary to mitigate risks, 
but governance structures can also be sources of 
risks or even systemic risks. The following consid-
erations are based on the assumption that the de-
pendability of the system is not only attained by re-
search, development and availability of potentially 
reliable ICT components, but the safety of real sys-
tems depends on the actual choice and deployment 
of system components within the constellation of 
the entire system and its overall architecture. In 
highly regulated industries, like the electricity in-
dustry, the actual design, choice and deployment of 
ICT components largely depends on the incentives 
and constraints given by governance structures and 
procedures. Therefore, we assume that governance 
may also provide incentives and constraints that 
may cause ICT-related risks that may have system-
ic consequences. After shedding some light on the 
understandings of systemic risks (Section 2), we 
point out potential sources of systemic risks in the 
electricity sector. In this paper, they are subdivided 
for a better understanding (Section 3 and 4), but in 
reality, such sources are closely related.
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Table 1: Fields of technological and sectoral developments of the “Smart Grid”
Fields Description
Wide-area monitor-
ing and control
Monitoring and control technologies, as well as advanced system analytics, enhance the data pro-
vision about the status of electricity systems components, behaviour and performance across inter-
connections and over large geographic areas. They help better to mitigate wide-area disturbances, 
for instance, by early warning systems, and improve transmission capacity and reliability, also 
better to balance volatile power supplies over long distances. Such applications necessitate coop-
eration across regional responsibilities for energy supply.
Transmission en-
hancement applica-
tions
Flexible alternating current transmission systems (FACTS) regulate the voltage and load flows in 
grids to handle incalculable load flows better, such as those from wind energy plants. High voltage 
direct current (HVDC) technologies are used to transport power across greater distances, like those 
from offshore wind farms.
Distribution grid 
management
Enhanced sensing and automation in distribution grid processes should reduce outage and repair 
time, for instance, by fault location or automatic network reconfigurations. It can also enable de-
centralized energy management, with local balancing between conventional and fluctuating energy 
technologies and transfers to the surrounding grid (see also the concept of “virtual power plants”, 
“islanding” or “micro grids”) (European Commission 2006, p. 27)
ICT integration To reach the goals of the transformation to the “smart grid”, it is stated that an “end-to-end” inte-
gration of all components of the energy system across different grids and across company bounda-
ries with the help of a uniform communication infrastructure is necessary. For this integration, 
the metaphor of the “internet of energy” was coined (BDI 2010). One crucial step is enabling the 
bi-directional communication between the actors. The communication infrastructure uses private 
utility communication networks or public networks (cellular, cable, telephone networks, internet).
Advanced metering 
infrastructure
The advanced metering infrastructure includes a range of technical deployments that should pro-
vide functionalities like sending remote price signals of power consumption, ability to collect, 
store and report customer energy consumption data, improve energy diagnostics, improve location 
of outages, remote connection or disconnection, or losses or theft detection. The components at the 
residential customer side are the so-called “smart meters”, which are the digital substitutes for the 
common Ferraris meters. In many European countries, it is a legal duty to install “smart meters”.2 
Commercial and industrial customers already use time-based measurement of their energy con-
sumption.
Customer-side 
systems (building 
automation, “smart 
homes”)
Such systems installed on the industrial or residential side include energy management systems, 
energy storage devices, “smart appliances”, and distributed generation. They are used to manage 
energy consumption and generation in order to realize energy efficiency gains or peak demand 
reductions. An important part is the “demand response management” (or “demand side manage-
ment”) envisaged with manual control by the customer or automated response by price-sensitive 
appliances connected to an energy management system or remotely controlled by the utility or 
system operator. Dynamic pricing is the basis for “demand response management” (see below).
Charging infra-
structure for electric 
vehicles
For the large-scale use of electric vehicles, a completely new infrastructure is necessary in order to 
facilitate decentralized charging, billing, or ancillary services, like peak load shaving or discharg-
ing, if electric vehicles serve as energy storages. In order to facilitate such transactions, interac-
tions with the advanced meter infrastructure and customer-side systems become necessary.
Economic applica-
tions and new busi-
ness models
With new business models it is planned that energy utility companies install and operate decentral-
ized energy production plants, like micro gas turbines or combined heat and power (CHP) plants at 
the customer side (“contracting”), transmission and distribution grid operators provide information 
services of generation and sales data, a larger number of actors become market players at energy 
exchanges, or new consultancy services emerge, such as those for energy consumption optimiza-
tion. For improving the shifting of power consumption by residential customers, energy companies 
have to provide dynamic pricing (e.g., time-differentiated pricing). All new business models re-
quire a functioning ICT infrastructure and standardized communication protocols that facilitate the 
automated processing of the large mass of transaction data.
Source: The non-exhaustive list is based on IEA (2011, pp. 17–20); BDI (2010, pp. 13–25), and Appelrath et al. 
(2011).
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2 Understandings of Systemic Risks
One of the main tasks of technology assessment 
is to identify risks of technological develop-
ments and to develop options to cope with them, 
including political measures. Currently, analyses 
of technology assessment are also extended to 
systemic risks (Hellström 2009; Klinke, Renn 
2006; Renn, Keil 2008; Keil et al. 2008). In the 
last years, analyses of systemic risks have gained 
considerable impetus through the financial crises, 
so that the majority of studies on systemic risks 
can be found in the field of finance and bank-
ing (e.g., Kaufman, Scott 2003; Kambhu et al. 
2007) (see also Willke in this issue). Only a few 
studies use the approach of “systemic risks” in 
analyses of infrastructure risks, and they mostly 
point to a need for further research (Hellström 
2007, 2009; Bartle, Laperrouza 2008; Laper-
rouza 2009; Mellstrand, Ståhl 2009). Besides the 
fact that there is currently no commonly accepted 
definition of “systemic risks”, there is also a need 
for further research to characterize systemic risks 
and to develop methods for their analysis.
In the following, systemic risks are under-
stood to be risks relating to or common to the en-
tire system, or large parts of it, endangering its 
functioning, performances or attainment of soci-
etal goals. Systemic risks may emerge when the 
organizational and technological structures of the 
system would enable propagations of failures or 
system-wide failures (Section 3), when the sector-
organizational and governance structures system-
atically lead to risk-generating behaviour or sub-
optimal risk management, or when governance 
structures do not develop adequately with tech-
nological or industrial developments endangering 
the achievement of societal goals like safety and 
the containment of risks, security of the energy 
supply, or social acceptability (Section 4). From 
this perspective, analyses of systemic risks in crit-
ical infrastructures have to take technical, indus-
trial, institutional, and governance structures and 
the interactions among them into account.
3 Cascading or System-wide Failures
Critical infrastructure systems, especially the elec-
tricity-, telecommunication-, computation-, and 
transport infrastructures increasingly converge on 
each other (e.g., Amin 2005) leading to increased 
interdependencies among infrastructure systems. 
Such interdependencies, especially among the 
electricity-, IT- and communication infrastruc-
tures, are already subjects of risk analyses and sim-
ulations to consider cascading effects in particular 
(Rinaldi et al. 2001; IRGC 2006, 2010; Panzieri, 
Setola 2008; Petermann et al. 2011). The analy-
ses demonstrate that the larger interdependencies 
among infrastructures, especially the increased in-
tegration of electricity networks with the internet, 
significantly lead to systemic risks, as exemplified 
by wide-area electric power outages. Internet con-
nections are used for control and communication 
in the electricity sector, but the operation of the 
internet infrastructure itself depends on electric-
ity, and has usually only limited energy reserves 
(Bartle, Laperrouza 2008; Petermann et al. 2011, 
pp. 70–93). However, besides such analyses, many 
questions are still open, such as who is responsi-
ble, with which scope, capabilities, cooperation 
models, or authority to monitor and govern in-
terdependencies among infrastructures, and how 
several new cyber security issues and new interde-
pendent components and actors, like internet serv-
ice providers, trust services, certification services, 
or energy consultancy services, are included.
The realization of the “smart grid” neces-
sitates a high level of connectivity in order to 
overcome “islands of automation” (NERC 2010, 
p. 12). To a large extent this should be based 
on Internet Protocol (IP) networks. On the one 
hand, IP networks facilitate a real-time, two-way 
communication that is essential for the “smart 
grid”, are also highly cost-effective by using ex-
isting internet communication lines (especially 
to households facilitating demand-side manage-
ment), use a flexible and widely accepted com-
munication standard, and have some reliability 
advantages due to the dynamic routing capabili-
ties (e.g., Davies 2010; Pearson 2011, p. 5214).
On the other hand, the use of IP networks 
brings more “openness” for accidental behaviour 
or malicious attacks, such as denial-of-service at-
tacks by flooding, exploits, viruses or worms (e.g. 
IRGC 2006, pp. 43–48). However, the actual reali-
zation of “internet-induced” risks depends on case-
specific deployments of security levels in IP com-
munication and the specific protection measures 
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used such as encryption, access control, authenti-
cation, etc. What makes the use of IP networks a 
factor for systemic risks is their common use and 
widespread knowledge about their vulnerabilities. 
If used on a mass scale, this implies “... making 
any vulnerabilities they carry also exploitable on 
a mass scale.” (Pearson 2011, p. 5214) The same 
holds true for the large-scale use of commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) hard- and software (includ-
ing operating systems) instead of using customized 
solutions. This is a common trend in the electricity 
sector (e.g., Ericsson 2010; Pearson 2011, p. 5214; 
see also Perrow in this issue). If, for example, IP-
connected and standardized “smart meters” based 
on commodity hard- and software are deployed 
on a mass scale, malicious hackers can turn off 
“smart meters” on a mass scale, which would have 
negative systemic impacts at the distribution level 
(McDaniel, McLaughlin 2009, pp. 76–77).
In addition, the “smart grid” infrastructure will 
be built on existing ICT applications in the elec-
tricity sector, so-called “legacy systems”, besides 
the newly-added “intelligent” systems. Therefore, 
vulnerabilities of the legacy systems could lead to 
compromises of the new “smart grid” technologies 
with systemic consequences (Flick, Morehouse 
2011, pp. 54–55). The mixture of newly-added 
and legacy ICT systems could lead to strange and 
hardly predictable behaviour, especially because a 
large portion of ICT components stem from third 
parties (Mellstrand, Ståhl 2009, p. 3). This is espe-
cially relevant in cases of software updates, where 
the interaction of added and legacy systems is of-
ten problematic to predict, with the result that they 
are often the reason for IT-related incidents in criti-
cal infrastructures (Tervo, Wiander 2010).
Another source of systemic risk can be seen 
in the massive amount of sensitive data transferred 
in the “smart grid”, like data from monitoring and 
control devices, administrative and personal data, 
like metering and billing information, or data of 
building controllers. Such data transfers have to 
be encrypted, necessitating a cryptographic-key 
management infrastructure. The high costs of 
maintaining such an infrastructure and the lim-
ited capabilities of such processors, that are likely 
to be installed in mass-uses, to conduct high-per-
formance encryptions contradict attaining such 
protection goals (Khurana et al. 2010, pp. 83–84).
4 Problematic Governance Structures
In the following, we assume that systematical-
ly-created risks are caused by failures in sec-
tor-organizational and regulative structures, in 
other words, the governance structures. In the 
normal running of businesses, inappropriate in-
centive structures may stimulate rational actors 
to generate risk factors. Here, the system itself 
produces conditions that endanger its functions 
and performances. If governance structures work 
system-wide, the implications do also. From this 
perspective, an assessment of systemic risks is 
an analysis of social processes that create, main-
tain or endanger a socio-technical infrastructure 
system (see also Büscher in this issue). Thus, we 
focus on the incentives and constraints that are 
imposed by governance structures and that influ-
ence how risks are actually handled by individual 
actors and, therefore, influence the dependability 
of components and of the entire system.
4.1 Problematic Incentives and Regulation
In general, we assume that, if governance struc-
tures do not stimulate or demand other behav-
iour, actors may create risks by system applica-
tions that follow especially an economic logic 
that might deviate from a security-engineering 
logic. In general, insights from behavioural, eco-
nomic and sociological research indicate that ac-
tors – in trading off external governance require-
ments (e.g., laws or regulations) or competitive 
advantages by high security reputation against 
profitability or capacities – do not invest in ICT 
security at a level that would be optimal from an 
security-engineering viewpoint (e.g., Croll 2010; 
Gordon, Loeb 2004; Dynes et al. 2008).
Governance reforms for liberalization and 
privatization impose economic pressures on infra-
structure operators (e.g., van der Vleuten, Lagen-
dijk 2010). That has led to decreasing redundancy 
or redundant back-up systems and letting electric-
ity systems be operated closer to the margin (e.g., 
IRGC 2006, pp. 20–29; Cohen 2010, p. 62). Cost 
considerations are also relevant when actors con-
nect control systems or Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems to IP con-
nections or utilize the aforementioned COTS sys-
tems (e.g., Apt et al. 2006, p. 222; Nartmann et al. 
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2009; IRGC 2006). Furthermore, infrastructure 
operators are less incentivized to report and share 
information about reliability problems, software 
failures or cyber threats, thus hampering the 
learning important in risk prevention (Apt et al. 
2006, pp. 226–229; US GAO 2011, pp. 24–25).
Another example is the certification of IT 
security, as one often favoured policy instrument 
for software security4, that is controversially dis-
cussed (e.g., Anderson, Fuloria 2009). Many cer-
tification schemes for software dependability ex-
amine the existence of standard proof procedures 
and not the evidence of the actual fulfilment of 
dependability goals (Jackson 2009, p. 80). Ad-
ditionally, a performance audit of risks govern-
ance structures conducted by the United States 
Government Accountability Office in 2009 to 
2011 indicates that infrastructure utilities are fo-
cusing more on compliance with cyber security 
requirements, in particular on meeting minimum 
regulatory requirements, instead of designing a 
comprehensive approach to system security (US 
GAO 2011, p. 23). Furthermore, consumers are 
sub-optimally informed about the options and 
benefits of secure systems, and consequently 
have a low willingness to pay for secure prod-
ucts. Here, improvements in governance with 
the help of effective certification and labelling 
schemes are needed (US GAO 2011, p. 23).
4.2 Increased Complexity of Actor 
Constellations
In general, economic and behavioural research on 
ICT security indicates that, in systems deployed 
and run by many actors, system safety may also 
have the characteristics of a “public good”, with 
the tendency that individual actors “free-ride” on 
the contributions by others, leading to an ineffi-
cient overall security level (e.g., Varian 2004). 
Since liberalization, unbundling of function-
alities, and privatization in the 1980s and 1990s, 
infrastructures are already complex, due to the 
increased number of market and governing ac-
tors, and due to institutional fragmentation (e.g., 
Mayntz 2009; Finger et al. 2005; de Bruijne, van 
Eeten 2007). The sectoral organization and regu-
lative structure of the energy sector become more 
complex through the large-scale integration of 
governance issues of ICT systems that may re-
sult in a higher risk of governance failures for in-
stance, due to failures to cooperate. This can be 
the case in providing public goods, like commonly 
usable laboratories for security testing, databases 
for knowledge about cyber threats or solutions 
and best practises, or like standards for interoper-
ability and transfer of transaction data5. Solutions 
are necessary to incentivize multiple actors with 
heterogeneous interests adequately to disclose and 
share data on system failures, and to cooperate in 
inter-firm governance settings to prevent systemic 
risks; or, if such measures are regarded as public 
goods, subsidizing of such measures by public 
funds should be considered (Assaf 2007; Dynes et 
al. 2008; Moore 2010; Masera 2010).
4.3 Incoherent Technological and 
Governance Developments
If governance structures and technologies do not 
develop correspondingly over the course of time, 
this can also cause systemic risks, in the sense that 
social goals like system safety, data protection, 
privacy, accessibility, social acceptability etc. (see 
also Finger et al. 2005; IRGC 2010, pp. 33–37) 
are not attained. For instance, this would be the 
case when the security-supervisory and regulative 
structure of critical infrastructures do not cover 
new risks or have inappropriate approaches in 
view of new risks, such as those from increased in-
terdependencies, when security regulations would 
be too slow to adapt to fast-evolving cyber threats, 
or when the now prevailing self-organization of 
security measures would turn out to be ineffective.
As an example, “smart grid”-related regu-
latory efforts by the German Federal Office of 
Information Security (BSI) focus mainly on the 
Protection Profile for “smart meters”. In contrast, 
security issues of IP-connected Energy Manage-
ment Systems in residential premises are at the 
moment unregulated, and are left to the decisions 
of customers. With the aforementioned informa-
tion lack about security issues, which customers 
usually have, and the resulting low willingness 
to pay for secure products, it is likely that the 
market outcome is a suboptimal security level.
Examples of further adverse governance 
structures in the electricity sector are unsuitable 
constellations of actors and the current version of 
the incentive regulation6 that hinder or do not suf-
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ficiently stimulate the necessary investments in 
the modernization of networks with “intelligent” 
systems (SRU 2011, pp. 477–484; Brunekreeft et 
al. 2011). Additionally, governmental actors in-
volved in public-private partnerships are highly 
dependent on the expertise of developers and op-
erators. This dependence is increasing ever more 
with the extended use of ICT in critical infra-
structures. Therefore, governance structures with 
a changed role of governments must be adapted 
to changed structures of expertise and knowledge 
(Dunn-Cavelty, Suter 2009; Mills et al. 2008).
Furthermore, a large portion of mechanisms 
and rules for managing and controlling the abun-
dance of transactions, such as system monitoring, 
metering, billing, etc., have to be programmed in 
software systems to be manageable at all (“soft-
ware as an institution”). However, if software-
based rules are not coherent with the existing reg-
ulative framework and with the expectations and 
values of users or affected actors – for instance, 
regarding access, affordability, treatment of per-
sonal data, or fairness of market conditions – then 
the acceptability of and the trust in the system 
are endangered, and their legitimacy questioned.7 
Advanced models of stakeholder participation 
in system development, standardization and use 
may contribute to preventing or mitigating such 
problems (e.g., Orwat, Raabe et al. 2010).
5 Conclusion
Risk assessments that focus only on the reliability 
of single components and physical interconnec-
tions are important, but seems not fully sufficient 
from a systemic viewpoint due to experiences 
with ICT-related organizational and regulative 
failures, increased interdependencies and com-
plexities, and incoherence between technical and 
governance developments as potential sources of 
risks. Instead, a complementary systemic perspec-
tive that explicitly takes the interactions and co-
development of technologies, social-organization-
al, regulative structures into account, seems more 
adequate to analyse reasons for dysfunctional be-
haviour of ICT systems, organizations or people, 
which may result from inappropriate incentives or 
controls of governance structures. From this per-
spective, the task of technology assessment is also 
to ask about the effectiveness and efficiency of risk 
governance structures, or whether the interplay of 
technology developments, sectoral-organizational 
and regulative governance structures causes new 
risks or even systemic risks.
Notes
1) This article is partly based on former publications by 
the author (Orwat, Büscher et al. 2010; Orwat 2011).
2) In Germany, Article 21c of the Energy Industry 
Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz – EnWG) requires 
the step-by-step installation of “smart meters” for 
buildings and plants since 2010. For a discussion 
of this legal duty, see Raabe et al. (2010).
3) In Germany, the most important legal security du-
ties for energy utilities are provided by the Energy 
Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz – EnWG). 
Other laws provide general IT security require-
ments, such as the Telecommunications Act (§ 109 
Telekommunikationsgesetz – TKG) or the Federal 
Data Protection Act (§ 9 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz 
– BDSG) (Gaycken, Karger 2011, pp. 6–7).
4) See, for instance, the ISO/IEC 27002 informa-
tion security standard, including certification, the 
“Common Criteria” certification scheme, or the 
standards for IT security management by the Ger-
man Federal Office of Information Security (BSI).
5) The current problem of incompatible data formats 
for smart meter communication, i.e. EDIFACT 
versus the XML standard, is an example.
6) Compare the Incentive Regulation Ordinance (An-
reizregulierungsverordnung – ARegV).
7) For example, due to consumer concerns on privacy 
issues the installation of “smart meters” is no long-
er compulsory in the Netherlands.
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Mechanisms of Systematic Risk 
Production
New Perspectives for TA Research?
by Christian Büscher, ITAS
Which questions have to be posed, which 
scientific problems have to be addressed, 
and also, what kind of instruments are ap-
propriate when tackling “Systemic Risk”? 
If complex systems cannot be analyzed in 
causalistic models, then TA and Systems 
Analysis have to reflect, first, on theoretical 
approaches, assessing the basic conditions 
and processes related to the reproduction of 
systems, and second, on innovative meth-
ods, gathering data to allow testing scientific 
constructions against reality. The analysis 
of “mechanisms” might be a direction of im-
pact for gaining insight into self-reinforcing 
processes, precarious couplings between 
systems, or between elements of systems, 
and, in the end, into the systematic produc-
tion of risk and danger.
1 General Considerations
Systems analysis has taken on the task of com-
prehensively documenting the social, econom-
ic, political, legal, as well as the technical and 
ecological consequences of planned action in 
system reproduction. In Technology Assess-
ment, Bechmann sees, for that reason, a need 
for new forms of reflection and analysis. “Any 
action which intervenes technically and planned 
(purposively) in the natural environment has to 
watch over its impacts on the environment and 
their repercussions on itself” (Bechmann 2007, 
p. 35; Translation CB). Bechmann derives this 
dictum from Luhmann’s suspicion that there 
will be not less, but more interventions into the 
natural environment, and that society, for that 
reason, should generate more knowledge about 
repercussions (Luhmann 1986, p. 39). With the 
concept of “systemic risks”, system-analytical 
considerations with respect to risk and hazards 
are tackled, which do not refer to the relation-
ship of society to its natural environment alone. 
It is much rather quite generally a matter of the 
